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ABSTRACT
In the mid-1980s, the timeframe that the Space Station Freedom 
Program was born, it was believed that a new dawn of international 
cooperative relationships for all future, large-scale manned space 
initiatives was also born. The Space Station Freedom would be the 
first such program that would characterize international 
partnerships where intricate and highly dependent relationships 
were the norm. Programs in the next decade and of the 21st 
century could be expected to be multi-year, multi-billion dollars 
and multi-national. The advantages of multiple nations cooperating 
toward a common goal are clear in terms of the economic realities 
of sharing in the high costs of research and technology programs, 
particularly the cost of manned space endeavors. The opportunity 
for nations to contribute in areas of their specific strengths 
would aid in pushing to the edge of technology. But there are some 
fundamental political and management challenges that programs such 
as the Space Station and future ones of this magnitude will face. 
Unless these challenges are understood and met head on, the success 
of them is uncertain.
PAST INTERNATIONAL COOPERATIVE SPACE ENDEAVORS
International participation in space endeavors is not new. There 
have been numerous cooperative scientific programs between NASA and 
a large number of international organizations. Historically, these 
arrangements have been characterized by independent contributions 
of specific hardware (instruments or infrastructure) which are 
integrated into a single satellite or payload under the overall 
management and control of NASA. As the space programs of other 
nations have matured, NASA has also contributed hardware or 
services to programs managed by the space agencies of other 
countries. These programs shared common elements* each 
participant could plan and manage their activity relatively 
independently as long as agreed-to interface requirements, program 
milestones and overall schedules were met. But as the nature of 
these programs has evolved in scope, complexity, and cost the 
relationship among the players has begun to evolve from joint 
participation towards true partnerships in a relatively high stakes 
game.
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Spacelab and the Remote Manipulator System are often cited as the 
first evolutionary step in international manned space programs. 
These programs do represent, for NASA, a major "sea change" in 
cooperation with an international entity (i.e., the European Space 
Agency and the Canadian Space Agency). NASA, however, was still 
clearly the dominant "partner," establishing the rules by which the 
junior partners could play. In these programs, NASA still 
maintained and demonstrated the U.S. space leadership role.
SPACE STATION FREEDOM "PARTNERSHIP"
With the initiation of the Space Station Freedom Program a 
fundamental difference from previous international space programs 
was introduced. From its inception, the Space Station Freedom 
Program was designed to be a partnership between nations where each 
participating government committed to carry the program through to 
completion. This commitment was formalized through Intergovernment 
Agreements (IGA's) executed on the part of the United States by the 
Secretary of State. In addition, Memoranda of Understanding 
(MOU's) were signed by the respective space agencies of each 
signatory nation. Thus a fundamental commitment was made both at 
the political level as well as the implementing level for this 
program.
The strength of this fundamental commitment has been "put to the 
test" several times in the life of the Space Station Freedom, and 
the results of the latest Clinton Administration pledge to honor 
the international partnership and commitments in the midst of major 
redesign are yet to be determined. In 1991, when the U.S. Congress 
came very close to canceling the Space Station Freedom Program, the 
three Partners, Japan, Canada, and the Europeans, issued a Joint 
Communique stating a "disbelief that the U.S.A. would now consider 
withdrawing from such an important international venture thereby 
effectively terminating the program." The hurdle of 1991 was 
tackled and the "partnership" was able to recover with the 
commitments in tact. This hurdle of 1993 appears to be even more 
of a challenge. The effort to "save billions" by redesigning the 
Station was directed by President Clinton. The impacts on the 
International Partners, although yet to be determined, have 
certainly caused the Partners to question the value of a U.S. 
"commitment."
Beyond the requirement of this fundamental national commitment, the 
evolution to a international space partnership relationship 
requires rethinking the ground rules by which such programs will be 
managed. The fact that other nations now have more to offer based 
on their growing maturity in the space business makes them more 
capable partners who are also less willing to simply sign-up under 
NASA dictates. By definition, a partnership involves close 
cooperation between parties having specified and joint rights and 
responsibilities. While it is easy to understand and define 
specific and individual responsibilities, the difficulty arises in 
defining and reaching agreement over the specific and joint rights
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shared by the partners. This has been particularly difficult for 
NASA which comes from a tradition of "going it alone" as opposed to 
the European Space Agency which from its inception was organized 
around the concept of a multinational partnership where each 
partner's rights, obligations, and responsibilities were negotiated 
and agreed to "up front". The "going it alone" attitude seems to 
extend beyond a NASA tradition — if political players have the 
power to rethink priorities to the point of impacting foreign 
commitments, a "partnership" will never truly be developed in the 
future space endeavors.
"PARTNERSHIP" CHALLENGES
The Space Station Freedom is unique when compared to past manned 
space flight endeavors but it has characteristics which will likely 
be shared by all future international manned endeavors.
COMMON ATTRIBUTES OF INTERNATIONAL MANNED PROGRAMS
o Satisfies scientific, economic, and political 
objectives
o Involves a large number of U.S. and foreign 
contractors and government agencies
o Requires resources in the multibillion dollar range 
o Extended time periods in excess of ten years
o Develops complex technology, sometimes reaching beyond 
the state of the art
o Utilizes large force of scientists, engineers, 
technicians, and administrative personnel
o Requires construction of extensive, expensive, and 
highly specialized facilities located across the world
o Obtains direct and constant Executive and
Congressional scrutiny (similar oversight in partners 
countries) throughout the life of the program
(TABLE 1)
For such partnership to survive, each partner must be sensitive to 
the variety of pressures and constraints acting upon the individual 
partners. Accommodations, both technical and political, must be 
found which will allow the partnership to be maintained. Several 
of these attributes may also be recognized as risks — such as 
multi-billion-dollar price tag and the program life time in excess 
of ten years.
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Political Challenges
A 1988 National Academies of Sciences and Engineering report stated 
that "partnerships with other nations and organizations can serve 
to demonstrate leadership, to forge productive relationships and to 
broaden the range of available opportunities, but only if 
international commitments are made carefully and honored 
fully...and be supported at the highest possible levels in the 
participating governments, with as much breadth as is feasible."
The political challenges that future partnerships may face seem to 
have all been experienced in the life of the Space Station Freedom 
Program. The political challenge of maintaining the original U.S. 
commitment from President Reagan in 1984 has taken a great deal of 
effort and the realities of 1993 indicate that the challenge will 
not be won easily. The White House has been occupied by two 
Presidents since Reagan and national priorities continue to change 
with every new Congress. No longer can the mere "excitement" of 
space exploration be the basis for maintaining commitment to manned 
space initiatives. For such programs to maintain a broad-based 
constituency over extended periods of time, these programs must 
serve the national interest, primarily economic interests.
This broad-based commitment must, as was stated above, be supported 
at the highest possible levels of participating governments. A 
program must then be prepared to maintain political support 
throughout the life of the program and "educate" the new political 
players about the program, the commitments, and the requirements as 
they enter into the process. The U.S. budget process, which 
requires NASA to justify their programs every year, may be the 
biggest hurdle large-scale initiatives face in the U.S. This 
process essentially allows Congress to reevaluate their 
"commitment" every year. To manage a program under this process is 
as challenging as it is inefficient when the commitment of a new 
Congress or an incoming Administration waivers, as it has in the 
Space Station Program. Each year, any individual has the 
opportunity to challenge whatever has previously been approved. 
The effort to regain and maintain political support has consumed a 
great deal of time and resources.
The broader the base of the original commitment, the easier it will 
be to maintain this support. The activities of the U.S. Space 
Station Freedom Program literally spread across 37 of the U.S. 
states. But given the diverse expectations concerning the Space 
Station and the "downscaling" due to budgetary constraints, not all 
expectations can be met with the initial capability. This has 
created a base of non-supporters.
The essence of a "partnership" can play a key role in a changing 
environment as well. A commitment made with an international 
entity is not made lightly and is not broken lightly. When one 
partner faces a threat that could impact another partner, 
politicians often respond to an international concern when they 
might have otherwise allowed the priority to slip lower. Although
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the international aspect of the Space Station Freedom has NOT 
deterred the Congress or the President from directing major 
"restructuring" changes and the current "redesign" exercise, 
they have always stated that the U.S. will "maintain our 
international commitments." Although the impact can never be 
measured, the international commitment may have prevent out-right 
cancellation of the Program in the face of the U.S. priority 
shifts.
Programmatic Challenges
Beyond this fundamental challenge of obtaining and maintaining 
political commitment, large space initiative will face additional 
challenges.
The term "programmatic" has been used within the Space Station 
Freedom Program to incorporate all the non-technical activities - 
many of the requirements that exist because of the bureaucratic 
nature of the management of cooperative endeavors. The inter­ 
relationship between the political, programmatic and technical 
considerations are very complex.
The essence of a "partnership" must be defined and agreed upon 
between partners at the outset of the program - not simply defining 
'who is responsible for what 1 in the technical sense, but the 
definition and establishment of the ground rules for the management 
of the program. The top-level agreements and understandings of the 
management structure proved to be an enormous effort for the Space 
Station Freedom Program. It was January 1984 when President Reagan 
announced his commitment for a space station and extended the 
invitation to other countries to participate. It was a year before 
Canada, Japan and Europe accepted the invitation "in principle" and 
it was the Fall of 1988 before the IGA's and MOU's were signed. 
The fact that four years were required to achieve this initial 
agreement exemplifies the challenges faced.
Other programmatic concerns within an international endeavor are 
the laws of the countries involved. Two very specific challenges 
that are and will be faced in these big-ticket space programs are 
the headline issues of "Technology Transfer" and "Buy 
American/European/Japanese" laws that most countries have. There 
is a delicate balance between the positive aspects of a partnership 
and the potential to "give too much away" in terms of new 
technology or potential profitable business. It is critical that 
the "programmatic" policy is developed in the earliest stages of a 
joint program to avoid upsetting the balance with either the 
political and technical challenges. The technical development 
should not be side-tracked when programmatic issues must be 
resolved or revisited.
A partnership attitude and trust must be developed between all 
players. For the good of the program as a whole, it is important 
that the programmatic status of each partner's responsibilities of
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the program is shared; i.e. the political or budgetary threats, 
issues within contractors, material availability, schedule delays. 
It is a challenge for each partner to know when an internal issue 
could effect the other partners and also when the other partners 
could have a positive approach to minimize a potential problem.
Technical Challenges
Although the expected management challenges of the future large- 
scale, manned space initiatives will be a major focus, a 
fundamental reason for establishing partnerships is to pool the 
technical resources and utilize the varied strengths of all 
partners in an effort to push the state of the art. A partnership 
will have been formed to approach a basic technical challenge. The 
technical immaturity of a space-related development goal introduces 
obstacles that will require a strong yet flexible management 
approach in order to progress. Development programs are evolving 
programs. The importance of establishing baseline is as important 
as establishing the means in which to change a baseline.
In the Memorandums of Understanding, each partner serves as a full 
member of the Space Station Control Board (SSCB). All partners 
have the opportunity to assess all design changes and submit 
impacts to the Board. The "partnership" is maintained by the 
programmatic requirement that ALL impacts must be addressed with 
recommendations to the SSCB chairman. Compromises often must be 
made at the Board.
An example of a recent design change and its unanticipated impact 
to the International Partner (specifically the European Space 
Agency, ESA) follows. The initial impact appeared to be a negative 
one on the partners, but at the conclusion of the assessment and 
solution proposal, the design change had positive effects in other 
ways.
A NASA technical decision was made to change to a "decentralized" 
avionics air cooling system. This decision resulted in an overall 
weight savings to the U.S. Laboratory at launch, additional savings 
in rack volume, and saving in the power usage — all considered to 
be critical improvements to the development program. The central 
avionics air cooling ducting was deleted, thereby forcing each 
payload and core systems rack to contain its own fan-forced cooling 
and rack controller package ("rack essential package"). Prior to 
this design change, NASA and the Partners had signed an 
"International Standard Rack Agreement". By changing this standard 
rack configuration, the program was forced to reassess the 
desirability of a standard rack and the impact to the Partners to 
accept the design changes in their racks.
Through a series of teleconferences and face-to-face technical 
meetings, it was decided that it was in the best interest of the 
whole program to maintain a common standard rack. In order to 
minimize the design (and cost) impact of the decision to the
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International Partners, NASA has agreed to provide to the Partners 
these "rack essential packages 11 .
In addition, through these technical discussions, it became evident 
that decision to maintain common racks had the additional benefit 
of achieving a common fire detection and suppression system across 
all modules, therefore improving Space Station safety.
To implement the design improvements, the partners would have 
incurred significant additional costs arising from changing their 
industry technical baseline. The costs incurred by NASA for 
procurement of the "rack essential packages" would avoid the 
significant additional costs which NASA would otherwise incur for 
unique interfaces, unique integration and verification activities, 
unique maintenance and spares requirements and the extensive safety 
analysis of the fire detection and suppression systems.
SSFP APPROACH TO ACHIEVE TOTAL PROGRAM INTEGRATION 
Joint Agreements
The Intergovernmental Agreement (between the U.S. Government and 
the Partner governments) and the individual Memorandums of 
Understanding (MOU) (between the government agencies — NASA 
agreements with the European Space Agency (ESA), the Canadian Space 
Agency (CSA), and the National Space Agency of Japan (NASDA) ) are 
the baselined, top-level agreements by which the partnerships are 
governed. The Intergovernmental Agreement provides the partnership 
objective and scope, international rights and obligations, and 
policy statements on such things as utilization, operations, 
liability, and exchange of data and goods. The MOU provides the 
basis for cooperation between NASA and its Partners with 
implementation details supporting the Intergovernmental Agreement 
policy statements .
Joint Management Mechanisms
There are also additional joint management mechanisms in the form 
of "living" documents (that are updated and grow with the program's 
maturity) and agreements that maintain programmatic, management and 
technical structure of the joint program.
Each MOU invokes a Joint Program Plan (JPP) to be signed by the 
program managers of the relevant agencies. This document addresses 
the Level I interrelationship between the NASA Program Director and 
the partner Level 1-equivalent manager. The JPP authorizes a Joint 
Management Plan (JMP) which defines the management process between 
the Level II SSFP Program Office and the respective partner Level 
II-equivalent program offices. This document defines all joint 
documentation, it defines all joint activities, and identifies 
organizational responsibilities associated with the Level II joint 
activities.
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There is a significant level of importance to have early definition 
of these "programmatics" in order to insure that the technical 
community is aware of the unique requirements driven by a 
partnership relationship. NASA is accustomed to forging ahead and 
making decisions based on pure technical assessments. The more 
players, the more potential for unexpected impacts which we are 
committed to consider.
The Program Definition and Requirements Document (PDRD) contains 
requirements for space station flight element and ground systems 
hardware and software, and provides the technical basis for the 
overall conduct of Phase C/D. In order to assure a "partnership" 
relationship as opposed to one where NASA hands requirements to the 
international participants, a "Joint" PDRD (JPDRD) is maintained 
with each Partner. Each JPDRD addresses the applicability of EVERY 
requirement in the PDRD. All requirement changes that are brought 
to the Control Board (SSCB) must address the applicability to the 
JPDRD paragraphs. This ensures partner participation in all 
proposed design changes.
Additional joint management mechanisms take the form of meetings 
and reviews. The bilateral Joint Program Reviews (JPRs) are held 
between NASA Level II and each Partner twice a year. The JPRs 
serve as the highest level forum for discussion and resolution of 
matters that requires the direct attention of the respective 
program managers. These face-to-face meetings have proven to be 
very effective in maintaining the successful implementation of 
program development. The full contingent of NASA and its Partners 
have a multilateral Program Management Review on a quarterly basis.
On a technical level, Technical Interchange Meetings, multi-, or 
bi-lateral, are called when a need arises, and have been utilized 
very effectively and occur on a routine basis at the working-level 
environments.
Lines of Authority
As much as joint management and team work play a critical role in 
the development of the Space Station Freedom, clearly there must be 
a position that possesses the ability to make a final decision on 
issues where compromise was unobtainable. The importance of having 
an "honest broker" is evident. The Level II Deputy Director of the 
SSFP is the chairman of the SSCB and has the final vote concerning 
the Station technical baseline. But in his position, he is not 
only "brokering" between NASA and the IPs, but the Work Packages as 
well. This management system with an independent program office 
was set up deliberately, to obtain decisions that are the best for 
the program as a whole. The IPs benefit from this structure. 
Should a jointly-agreed-to solution not be achievable at Level II, 
an appeal avenue is possible via Level I. This appeal route has 
not been utilized to date.
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CONCLUSIONS
The Space Station Freedom Program, could represent the first of an 
a potential wave of future space exploration international 
initiatives - for the near and far future. This program can 
represent how serious the U.S. is concerning international
commitments.
This program does represent a transition for NASA as~ it 
international partners on a more equitable basis than on previous 
cooperative programs. The technical success of these eindeawom 
relies heavily on the establishment of the ground rules as early mm 
possible in the program. The complexity of a progrm degrade 
attention to the critical importance of working within those rules 
at all levels of the organizations. Close cooperation is 
simply a desire, but a requirement at all phases of the progran*
Each partner must recognize the complexities of the 
interrelationship between the political, programmatic and tedmicaJ. 
aspects of all programs and stand by the commitments established*
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